Hegelian Inconsistencies, related to God II

The problem with every conception of God is that it is based on a logical necessity and only then as existential; which means to base existence on a logical —and therefore apparent— necessity as reality itself; which is nevertheless only conventional, since it derives its consistency from this convention of logic, as transcendental. This is the basic problem with Hegel, whose subtlety —like that of Scotus— lies in avoiding the problem rather than solving it; for the logical excess of German Transcendentalism seeks to preserve the convention of God in the conflict over nature[1].

This is Hegel's problem, as the culmination of the last cycle of rationalism, which would have started with Kant; in what will be Irrationalism, but not as a negation of Reason, but its understanding as Transcendental; in an intuition about the distinction of the real, which still subordinates the immanent to its transcendence. The conflict is not small but serious, and existential in a way, just that exclusively for philosophers; which since the problem of universals has gone out of the way politically, as only the Patristics before it[2].

The conflict is not gratuitous either, with the excess only be in that subordination of the immanent to its transcendence; which is erroneous, inasmuch as transcendence is a condition of to the immanent, as immanence is proper to Being. This distortion is due to the fact that we always start from the problem of God, as theocentric and not from that of man; already solved by the Patristic Christology, but contracted now because the risk of relativism, which is a political conflict.

Transcendentalism thus aims at the comprehension of the real as inmano-transcendent, in the Hegelian absolute; with an instrument as efficient as Logic, as Practical Reason —supra-rational— in its transcendence. However, this cannot be comprehended, in the subjection to the necessity of an absolute transcendence of God; which cannot be questioned, on pain of dismantling the hermeneutical spectrum of Christianity, which grants the political order.

As already seen, a God’s absolute transcendence would not be affected by an absolute immanence of His; but that is something difficult to understand, in a spectrum that operates on the dichotomous principle of dialectics; the one that opposed a rational purism to the theological complex of Trinitarianism, with Arianism. As hermeneutic, the crisis would not then be initiated by the Cartesian protest against syllogism, which is anecdotal; but by the Protestant Reformation, with its immediate political impact, rejecting Catholicism as superstition[3]; and by which it creates the extensive problem of the philosophies of nature, deriving into that of God with Transcendentalism.

This crisis is then what is organized around Rationalism, but as an instrument and not as a cause, on ontology[4]; allowing the development of this new spectrum of modern Idealism, as a renewal of the classical in its Transcendentalism. Hence, it becomes a hyper-specialization of Augustinian dogmatism, against the relativism of Casuistry; but for which it turns to Logic as Transcendent Reason, postulated as practical —against Pure Reason— in Kant.

This would be what produces the complexity of Transcendentalism, trying to explain the real in terms of absolute; ending in that self-referential quality of logic, with the loop of dialectics, because the relativity of the real. It is also the dynamic that produces the first distortion —since the Council of Nicaea— of culture, by Christianity; imposing its determinations from politics and not the other way, as that same transcendent immano problem of the real[5].

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[1] . From the point of view of English naturalism, the problem of Nature is not the nature of things, but the real in its own manifestation.

[2] . In fact, the Patristics would produce the Arian conflict, to be resolved only by imperial authority.

[3] . This is the attempt —even as a principle— of determinate culture from politics, as at the beginning with Plato; distorting the functional structure of culture as reality, with the artificiality of the dialectic conflicts in nature.  

[4] . This refers to the “I think, therefore I am” as the ontological scope of Cartesianism.

[5] . It is worth noting here that the transcendent immano value is transcendental, insofar as it affects the immanent by its transcendence; so the intuition of transcendentalism is efficient as a principle, only insufficient, and in this — paradoxically — excessive. This conclusion would prove here the hermeneutical nature of the problem, as with the ancient cosmologies; in their function of understanding of reality, even equally regulated by the supra structural function —not nature— of religion.

Hegelian inconsistencies, related to God I

Hegel doesn’t deny the conception of God, he even tries to define it deriving from the difficulties of empiricism; the problem here is the contradiction it doesn’t solves, as the proper nature of His, since it’s not a being. In this logic, since Parmenides the not being can’t be something, or it becomes a being, thus the problem with this; unless it’s about not being a specific being, in that sense of its universality —as it looks like—, in which it’s then a condition.

Not being a being but a condition, explanation God emanating of us as from nature, functioning as His Immanence; being then this reality itself —which is still a being just not specific— with God as its own peak and excellence. This conception of God has an apparent problem though, in its lack of proper immanence, as identity different from us; which is normal for a Nature, and thus reduce God to the typical mechanics of all rationalizations, like these of Aristotle and Aquinas.

But God have necessarily an identity, in the same concept of its divinity as objective, or He doesn’t exist at all; which is the problem bordered by Hegel, refusing to enter a dangerous political terrain of his convulse time. Here comes the other problem of contextualization, explaining the intricacy of Hegel outside its magnificence; as that context of his in the politics problematizes his philosophy, which is also his profession and thus his way of life.

This is the problem with Hegel's thought, as it’s impossible to decontextualize it in danger of breaking its own logic; of course, when decontextualized it becomes absolute in value, but only as self-referent. This doesn’t make sense though, since Hegel doesn’t exist by itself but as the peak of Transcendental Idealism; and this is not an organized doctrine but a hermeneutical spectrum, formed as a more or lest chaotic mass of critical contradictions; also more or less systematized —more than less— by Hegel, but not as definitely as to solve all those contradictions.

That’s why the problem of authority’s fallacy is so recurrent in Hegelianism, functioning as its own reference; while it doesn’t stand its proper contextualization either, due the extra philosophical (political) pressures it eludes. In itself, at the moment of Hegel, Transcendental Idealism is already a dialectical loop; that refusing to digress in its multiple contradictions from politics, becomes increasingly intricate, turning around itself.

It may come as density because its intricacies, but then lacks the consistency of the reality it struggles to understand; and this is the problem of that conception of God, with its nature as primary transcendent and only then immanent. The problem here is that transcendence is a condition of immanence, not the other way around; since immanence is the condition of the being as being itself, even if determined by what’s not said being.

Let’s intricate, cabalistic Neoplatonism —in the same basis of Transcendental Idealism— solves this problem; contracting the absolute immanence of God on its will of Transcendence, to make place for this Transcendence; which then becomes of relative immanence —as a result of this contradiction— in its Son. Here God’s absolute transcendence becomes from its absolute immanence, to become that new transcendence; like in the Second Person of Trinity, which is that relative immanence, but turning to that absolute Transcendence of His First Person.

Of course, this is Cabalism applied to Christianity as an understanding of reality, in Christ as the Son of God; but it’s a solution given by Cabala itself —as a recurrence[1]—, with the category of Kether as that of the Son; resulting from that contraction in Titsum; which would become the God’s relationship with itself as reality (Kether), on its own determination (Ain-Soft). This turns Transcendental Idealism a corruption of its own hermeneutical base in Platonism, affecting its consistency; while showing the near Plato birth of Realism —with Aristotle— its needed adequation, in a better understanding of reality; still idealistic as a mere comprehension of reality —in a representation— and not reality itself, but without the distortions of dialectics.

 

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[1] . This mean that the development of mysticism in Cabalistic and Christian traditions are linked for its recurrence to platonic and neo platonic idealism, not historical or political context.

Cándido y el pesimismo

El mejor de los mundos posibles es una teoría filosófica de Leibniz, que así se inscribe en la corriente del idealismo trascendental; de hecho, aunque es todavía una filosofía, es de base teológica, explicando en ello su trascendentalismo. La teoría asume que este es el mejor de los mundos posibles, porque siendo obra de Dios no puede ni siquiera ser mediocre; una argumentación de racionalidad directa y simple, y por tanto susceptible de caer en las falacias continuas de la sofística. A ello se debe el escepticismo con que Voltaire se burla de ese optimismo, con el sarcasmo de su novela Cándido; en que el protagonista, bajo el mentorazgo de un leibniziano de burlas, se expone al descalabro continuo en su choque con la realidad.

Sin embargo, no hay que perder de vista que Voltaire es francés, pionero del humanismo racionalista que contrasta con el pragmatismo inglés; que en su exigencia de positividad ignora —como Leibniz— el carácter representacional y por ende extrapositivo del concepto de Dios. Es decir, si Dios —o lo divino— como concepto es una representación sobre la determinación de la realidad, esta es por tanto un orden; que resolviéndose en el equilibrio, por más precario que este sea, resulta siempre de una contradicción de principios opuestos; siendo por tanto no sólo un resultado positivo sino el mejor resultado posible, que en su continuidad es dado como el mundo. Es decir, entendiendo que de esta oposición puede resultar la no existencia del mundo, su propia realidad es un hecho positivo; lo que no tiene nada que ver con las connotaciones morales con que se le asume en el Cándido, que en su sarcasmo se refiere a la candidez como virtud; sino con la consistencia propia de lo real, de lo que es posible extraer una reflexión moral, pero que no la postula por sí mismo.

El otro problema recurrente aquí es el drama mismo del desastre, al que se enfrenta siempre Cándido en su candidez; que como virtud, representa con espontánea eficacia el estado de desconocimiento absoluto del Ser (cándido) respecto a su realidad. Eso no es un silogismo, sino la paradoja por la que la reflexión de Voltaire le habría sobrepasado a él mismo, explicándole su propia contradicción; ya que los tropiezos del Cándido se refieren a su ignorancia sobre estas determinaciones, y no a una naturaleza perversa de la realidad; que bien vista, sería tan absurda como una bondad suya —que le hubiera atribuido Leibniz—, ya que la moral es siempre una cualidad de lo humano.

De hecho nuevamente, habría que entender que Voltaire se mueve en el mundo de la cultura como realidad; y que esa realidad sí poseería esa cualidad moral en cuanto humana, que desconoce lo real por sí mismo. Desde ese punto de vista, el Cándido no tropieza con la realidad sino con su realidad, que es distinta de aquella en el sentido humano; por lo que el burlesco doctor Pangloss sí tendría razón, refiriéndose a la vida como esa capacidad continua para participar de la realidad.

Se sabe además que el concepto de Leibniz no es moral sino matemático, invalidando la burla procaz de Voltaire; y es difícil que Voltaire desconociera esta diferencia, remitiendo su burla a la mera manipulación retórica y el sofisma. Del atractivo de esa procacidad de Voltaire para el magisterio, es que se concluye el apocalipsis de la postmodernidad; como ese fanguero donde cae por última vez el Cándido, empujado por el lápiz artero de su autor al lago de su ignorancia.